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Abstract. We consider non-atomic network congestion games with het-
erogeneous players where the latencies of the paths are subject to some
bounded deviations. This model encompasses several well-studied exten-
sions of the classical Wardrop model which incorporate, for example,
risk-aversion, altruism or travel time delays. Our main goal is to analyze
the worst-case deterioration in social cost of a deviated Nash flow (i.e.,
for the perturbed latencies) with respect to an original Nash flow.
We show that for homogeneous players deviated Nash flows coincide
with approximate Nash flows and derive tight bounds on their ineffi-
ciency. In contrast, we show that for heterogeneous populations this
equivalence does not hold. We derive tight bounds on the inefficiency
of both deviated and approximate Nash flows for arbitrary player sen-
sitivity distributions. Intuitively, our results suggest that the negative
impact of path deviations (e.g., caused by risk-averse behavior or latency
perturbations) is less severe than approximate stability (e.g., caused by
limited responsiveness or bounded rationality).
We also obtain a tight bound on the inefficiency of deviated Nash
flows for matroid congestion games and homogeneous populations if the
path deviations can be decomposed into edge deviations. In particular,
this provides a tight bound on the Price of Risk-Aversion for matroid
congestion games.
1 Introduction
In 1952, Wardrop [17] introduced a simple model, also known as the Wardrop
model, to study outcomes of selfish route choices in traffic networks which are
affected by congestion. In this model, there is a continuum of non-atomic play-
ers, each controlling an infinitesimally small amount of flow, whose goal is to
choose paths in a given network to minimize their own travel times. The latency
(or delay) of each edge is prescribed by a non-negative, non-decreasing latency
function which depends on the total flow on that edge. Ever since its introduc-
tion, the Wardrop model has been used extensively, both in operations research
and traffic engineering studies, to investigate various aspects of selfish routing
in networks.
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More recently, the classical Wardrop model has been extended in various ways
to capture more complex player behaviors. Examples include the incorporation
of uncertainty attitudes (e.g., risk-aversion, risk-seeking), cost alterations (e.g.,
latency perturbations, road pricing), other-regarding dispositions (e.g., altruism,
spite) and player biases (e.g., responsiveness, bounded rationality).
Several of these extensions can be viewed as defining some modified cost
for each path which combines the original latency with some ‘deviation’ (or
perturbation) along that path. Such deviations are said to be β-bounded if the
total deviation along each path is at most β times the latency of that path. The
player objective then becomes to minimize the combined cost of latency and
deviation along a path (possibly using different norms). An equilibrium outcome
corresponds to a β-deviated Nash flow, i.e., a Nash flow with respect to the
combined cost. The deviations might be given explicitly (e.g., as in the altruism
model of Chen et al. [1]) or be defined implicitly (e.g., as in the risk-aversion
model of Nikolova and Stier-Moses [13]). Further, different fractions of players
might perceive these deviations differently, i.e., players might be heterogeneous
with respect to the deviations.
Another extension, which is closely related to the one above, is to incorporate
different degrees of ‘responsiveness’ of the players. For example, each player
might be willing to deviate to an alternative route only if her latency decreases
by at least a certain fraction. In this context, an equilibrium outcome corresponds
to an -approximate Nash flow for some  ≥ 0, i.e., for each player the latency
is at most (1 + ) times the latency of any other path. Here,  is a parameter
which reflects the responsiveness of the players. An analogue definition can be
given for populations with heterogeneous responsiveness parameters.
To illustrate the relation between deviated and approximate Nash flows, sup-
pose we are given a β-deviated Nash flow f for some β ≥ 0, where the latency
P (f) of each path P is perturbed by an arbitrary β-bounded deviation δP (f)
satisfying 0 ≤ δP (f) ≤ βlP (f). Intuitively, the deviations inflate the latency on
each path by at most a factor of (1+ β). Further, assume that the population is
homogeneous. From the Nash flow conditions (see Sect. 2 for formal definitions),
it follows trivially that f is also an -approximate Nash flow with  = β. But does
the converse also hold? That is, can every -approximate Nash flow be induced
by a set of bounded path deviations? More generally, what about the relation
between deviated and approximate Nash flows for heterogenous populations?
Can we bound the inefficiency of these flows?
In this paper, we answer these questions by investigating the relation between
the two equilibrium notions. Our main goal is to quantify the inefficiency of
deviated and approximate Nash flows, both for homogeneous and heterogeneous
populations. To this aim, we study the (relative) worst-case deterioration in
social cost of a β-deviated Nash flow with respect to an original (unaltered)
Nash flow; we use the term β-deviation ratio to refer to this ratio. This ratio has
recently been studied in the context of risk aversion [9,13] and in the more general
context of bounded path deviations [6]. Similarly, for approximate Nash flows we
are interested in bounding the -stability ratio, i.e., the worst-case deterioration
in social cost of an -approximate Nash flow with respect to an original Nash flow.
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Note that these notions differ from the classical price of anarchy notion [8],
which refers to the worst-case deterioration in social cost of a β-deviated (respec-
tively, ε-approximate) Nash flow with respect to an optimal flow. While the
price of anarchy typically depends on the class of latency functions (see, e.g.,
[1,2,6,13] for results in this context), the deviation ratio is independent of the
latency functions but depends on the topology of the network (see [6,13]).
Our Contributions. The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
1. We show that for homogeneous populations the set of β-deviated Nash flows
coincides with the set of -approximate Nash flows for β = . Further, we
derive an upper bound on the -stability ratio (and thus also on the -deviation
ratio) which is at most (1 + )/(1 − n), where n is the number of nodes, for
single-commodity networks. We also prove that the upper bound we obtain
is tight for generalized Braess graphs. These results are presented in Sect. 4.
2. We prove that for heterogenous populations the above equivalence does not
hold. We derive tight bounds for both the β-deviation ratio and the -stability
ratio for single-commodity instances on series-parallel graphs and arbitrary
sensitivity distributions of the players. To the best of our knowledge, these
are the first inefficiency results in the context of heterogenous populations
which are tight for arbitrary sensitivity distributions. Our bounds show that
both ratios depend on the demands and sensitivity distribution γ of the het-
erogenous players (besides the respective parameters β and ). Further, it
turns out that the β-deviation ratio is always at most the -stability ratio for
 = βγ. These results are given in Sect. 3.
3. We also derive a tight bound on the β-deviation ratio for single-commodity
matroid congestion games and homogeneous populations if the path devia-
tions can be decomposed into edge deviations. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first result in this context which goes beyond network congestion
games. In particular, this gives a tight bound on the Price of Risk-Aversion
[13] for matroid congestion games. This result is of independent interest and
presented in Sect. 4.
In a nutshell, our results reveal that for homogeneous populations there
is no quantitative difference between the inefficiency of deviated and approx-
imate Nash flows in the worst case. In contrast, for heterogenous populations
the β-deviation ratio is always at least as good as the -stability ratio with
 = βγ. Intuitively, our results suggest that the negative impact of path devia-
tions (e.g., caused by risk-averse behavior or latency perturbations) is less severe
than approximate stability (e.g., caused by limited responsiveness or bounded
rationality).
Related Work. We give a brief overview of the works which are most related
to our results. Christodoulou et al. [2] study the inefficiency of approximate
equilibria in terms of the price of anarchy and price of stability (for homogeneous
populations). Generalized Braess graphs were introduced by Roughgarden [14]
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and are used in many other lower bound constructions (see, e.g., [3,6,14]). Chen
et al. [1] study an altruistic extension of the Wardrop model and, in particular,
also consider heterogeneous altruistic populations. They obtain an upper bound
on the ratio between an altruistic Nash flow and a social optimum for parallel
graphs, which is tight for two sensitivity classes. It is mentioned that this bound
is most likely not tight in general. Meir and Parkes [11] study player-specific cost
functions in a smoothness framework [15]. Some of their inefficiency results are
tight, although none of their bounds seems to be tight for arbitrary sensitivity
distributions. Matroids have also received some attention in the Wardrop model.
In particular, Fujishige et al. [5] show that matroid congestion games are immune
against the Braess paradox (and their analysis is tight in a certain sense). We
refer the reader to [6] for additional references and relations of other models to
the bounded path deviation model considered here.
2 Preliminaries
Let I = (E, (le)e∈E , (Si)i∈[k], (ri)i∈[k]) be an instance of a non-atomic congestion
game. Here, E is the set of resources (or edges, or arcs) that are equipped with a
non-negative, non-decreasing, continuous latency function le : R≥0 → R≥0. Each
commodity i ∈ [k] has a strategy set Si ⊆ 2E and demand ri ∈ R>0. Note that in
general the strategy set Si of player i is defined by arbitrary resource subsets. If
each strategy P ∈ Si corresponds to an si, ti-path in a given directed graph, then
the corresponding game is called a network congestion game.1 We slightly abuse
terminology and use the term path also to refer to a strategy P ∈ Si of player i
(which does not necessarily correspond to a path in a graph); no confusion shall
arise. We denote by S = ∪iSi the set of all paths.
An outcome of the game is a (feasible) flow f i : Si → R≥0 satisfying∑
P∈Si f
i
P = ri for every i ∈ [k]. We use F(S) to denote the set of all feasible
flows f = (f1, . . . , fk). Given a flow f = (f i)i∈[k] ∈ F(S), we use f ie to denote
the total flow on resource e ∈ E of commodity i ∈ [k], i.e., f ie =
∑
P∈Si:e∈P f
i
P .
The total flow on edge e ∈ E is defined as fe =
∑
i∈[k] f
i
e.
The latency of a path P ∈ S with respect to f is defined as lP (f) :=∑
e∈P le(fe). The cost of commodity i with respect to f is Ci(f) =∑
P∈Si fP lP (f). The social cost C(f) of a flow f is given by its total aver-
age latency, i.e., C(f) =
∑
i∈[k] Ci(f) =
∑
e∈E fele(fe). A flow that minimizes
C(·) is called (socially) optimal.
If the population is heterogenous, then each commodity i ∈ [k] is further
partitioned in hi sensitivity classes, where class j ∈ [hi] has demand rij such
that ri =
∑
j∈[hi] rij . Given a path P ∈ Si, we use fP,j to refer to the amount
of flow on path P of sensitivity class j (so that
∑
j∈[hi] fP,j = fP ).
1 If a network congestion game with a single commodity is considered (i.e., k = 1), we
omit the commodity index for ease of notation.
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Deviated Nash flows. We consider a bounded deviation model similar to the one
introduced in [6].2 We use δ = (δP )P∈S to denote some arbitrary path deviations,
where δP : F(S) → R≥0 for all P ∈ S. Let β ≥ 0 be fixed. Define the set of
β-bounded path deviations as Δ(β) = {(δP )P∈S | 0 ≤ δP (f) ≤ βlP (f) for all f ∈
F(S)}.
Every commodity i ∈ [k] and sensitivity class j ∈ [hi] has a non-negative sen-
sitivity γij with respect to the path deviations. The population is homogeneous
if γij = γ for all i ∈ [k], j ∈ [hi] and some γ ≥ 0; otherwise, it is heterogeneous.
Define the deviated latency of a path P ∈ Si for sensitivity class j ∈ [hi] as
qjP (f) = lP (f) + γijδP (f).
We say that a flow f is a β-deviated Nash flow if there exist some β-bounded
path deviations δ ∈ Δ(β) such that
∀i ∈ [k],∀j ∈ [hi],∀P ∈ Si, fP,j > 0 : qjP (f) ≤ qjP ′(f) ∀P ′ ∈ Si. (1)
We define the β-deviation ratio β-DR(I) as the maximum ratio C(fβ)/C(f0)
of an β-deviated Nash flow fβ and an original Nash flow f0. Intuitively, the
deviation ratio measures the worst-case deterioration in social cost as a result
of (bounded) deviations in the path latencies. Note that here the comparison
is done with respect to an unaltered Nash flow to measure the impact of these
deviations.
The set Δ(β) can also be restricted to path deviations which are defined
as a function of edge deviations along that path. Suppose every edge e ∈ E
has a deviation δe : R≥0 → R≥0 satisfying 0 ≤ δe(x) ≤ βle(x) for all
x ≥ 0. For example, feasible path deviations can then be defined by the L1-
norm objective δP (f) =
∑
e∈P δe(x) (as in [6,13]) or the L2-norm objective
δP (f) =
√∑
e∈P δe(x)2) (as in [9,13]). The Price of Risk-Aversion introduced
by Nikolova and Stier-Moses [13] is technically the same ratio as the deviation
ratio for the L1- and L2-norm (see [6] for details).
Approximate Nash Flows. We introduce the notion of an approximate Nash
flow. Also here, each commodity i ∈ [k] and sensitivity class j ∈ [hi] has a non-
negative sensitivity ij . We say that the population is homogeneous if ij =  for
all i ∈ [k], j ∈ [hi] and some  ≥ 0; otherwise, it is heterogeneous.
A flow f is an -approximate Nash flow with respect to sensitivities  =
(ij)i∈[k],j∈[hi] if
∀i ∈ [k], ∀j ∈ [hi], ∀P ∈ Si, fP,j > 0 : lP (f) ≤ (1+ij)lP ′(f) ∀P ′ ∈ Si (2)
Note that a 0-approximate Nash flow is simply a Nash flow. We define the -
stability ratio -SR(I) as the maximum ratio C(f )/C(f0) of an -approximate
Nash flow f  and an original Nash flow f0.
Some of the proofs are missing in the main text below and can be found in
[7].
2 In fact, in [6] more general path deviations are introduced; the path deviations
considered here correspond to (0, β)-path deviations in [6].
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3 Heterogeneous Populations
We first elaborate on the relation between deviated and approximate Nash flows
for general congestion games with heterogeneous populations.
Proposition 1. Let I be a congestion game with heterogeneous players. If f is
a β-deviated Nash flow for I, then f is an -approximate Nash flow for I with
ij = βγij for all i ∈ [k] and j ∈ [hi] (for the same demand distribution r).
Discrete Sensitivity Distributions. Subsequently, we show that the reverse of
Proposition 1 does not hold. We do this by providing tight bounds on the β-
deviation ratio and the -stability ratio for instances on (single-commodity)
series-parallel graphs and arbitrary discrete sensitivity distributions.
Theorem 1. Let I be a single-commodity network congestion game on a series-
parallel graph with heterogeneous players, demand distribution r = (ri)i∈[h] nor-
malized to 1, i.e.,
∑
j∈[h] ri = 1, and sensitivity distribution γ = (γi)i∈[h], with
γ1 < γ2 < · · · < γh. Let β ≥ 0 be fixed and define  = (βγi)i∈[h]. Then the
-stability ratio and the β-deviation ratio are bounded by:
-SR(I) ≤ 1 + β
h∑
j=1
rjγj and β-DR(I) ≤ 1 + β · max
j∈[h]
{
γj
( h∑
p=j
rp
)}
. (3)
Further, both bounds are tight for all distributions r and γ.
It is not hard to see that the bound on the β-deviation ratio is always smaller
than the bound on the -stability ratio.3 Our bound on the β-deviation ratio also
yields tight bounds on the Price of Risk-Aversion [13] for series-parallel graphs
and arbitrary heterogeneous risk-averse populations, both for the L1-norm and
L2-norm objective.4
We need the following technical lemma for the proof of the β-deviation ratio.
Lemma 1. Let 0 ≤ τk−1 ≤ · · · ≤ τ1 ≤ τ0 and ci ≥ 0 for i = 1, . . . , k be given.
We have c1τ0 +
∑k−1
i=1 (ci+1 − ci)τi ≤ τ0 · maxi=1,...,k{ci}.
Proof (Theorem 1, β-deviation ratio). Let x = fβ be a β-deviated Nash flow
with path deviations (δP )P∈S ∈ Δ(β) and let z = f0 be an original Nash flow.
Let X = {a ∈ A : xa > za} and Z = {a ∈ A : za ≥ xa and za > 0} (arcs with
xa = za = 0 may be removed without loss of generality).
In order to analyze the ratio C(x)/C(z) we first argue that we can assume
without loss of generality that the latency function la(y) is constant for values
y ≥ xa for all arcs a ∈ Z. To see this, note that we can replace the function la(·)
with the function lˆa defined by lˆa(y) = la(xa) for all y ≥ xa and lˆa(y) = la(y)
3 This follows from Markov’s inequality: for a random variable Y , P (Y ≥ t) ≤ E(Y )/t.
4 Observe that we show tightness of the bound on parallel arcs, in which case these
objectives coincide.
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for y ≤ xa. In particular, this implies that the flow x is still a β-deviated Nash
flow for the same path deviations as before. This holds since for any path P the
latency lP (x) remains unchanged if we replace the function la by lˆa.
By definition of arcs in Z, we have xa ≤ za and therefore lˆa(za) = la(xa) ≤
la(za). Let z′ be an original Nash flow for the instance with la replaced by lˆa.
Then we have C(z′) ≤ C(z) using the fact that series-parallel graphs are immune
to the Braess paradox, see Milchtaich [12, Lemma 4]. Note that, in particular,
we find C(x)/C(z) ≤ C(x)/C(z′). By repeating this argument, we may without
loss of generality assume that all latency functions la are constant between xa
and za for a ∈ Z. Afterwards, we can even replace the function lˆa by a function
that has the constant value of la(xa) everywhere.
In the remainder of the proof, we will denote Pj as a flow-carrying arc for sen-
sitivity class j ∈ [h] that maximizes the path latency amongst all flow-carrying
path for sensitivity class j ∈ [h], i.e., Pj = argmaxP∈P:xP,j>0{lP (x)}. Moreover,
there also exists a path P0 with the property that za ≥ xa and za > 0 for all
arcs a ∈ P0 (see, e.g., Lemma 2 [12]).
For fixed a < b ∈ {1, . . . , h}, the Nash conditions imply that (these steps are
of a similar nature as Lemma 1 [4])
lPa(x) + γa · δPa(x) ≤ lPb(x) + γa · δPb(x)
lPb(x) + γb · δPb(x) ≤ lPa(x) + γb · δPa(x).
Adding up these inequalities implies that (γb−γa)δPb(x) ≤ (γb−γa)δPa(x), which
in turn yields that δPb(x) ≤ δPa(x) (using that γa < γb if a < b). Furthermore,
we also have
lP1(x) + γ1δP1(x) ≤ lP0(x) + γ1δP0(x), (4)
and lP0(x) = lP0(z) ≤ lP1(z) ≤ lP1(x), which can be seen as follows. The equality
follows from the fact that la is constant for all a ∈ Z and, by choice, P0 only
consists of arcs in Z. The first inequality follows from the Nash conditions of the
original Nash flow z, since there exists a flow-decomposition in which the path
P0 is used (since the flow on all arcs of P0 is strictly positive in z). The second
inequality follows from the fact that
∑
e∈P1
le(ze) =
∑
e∈P1∩X
le(ze) +
∑
e∈P1∩Z
le(ze) ≤
∑
e∈P1∩X
le(xe) +
∑
e∈P1∩Z
le(xe)
using that ze ≤ xe for e ∈ X and the fact that latency functions for e ∈ Z
are constant. In particular, we find that lP0(x) ≤ lP1(x). Adding this inequality
to (4), we obtain γ1δP1(x) ≤ γ1δP0(x) and therefore δP1(x) ≤ δP0(x). Thus
δPh(x) ≤ δPh−1(x) ≤ · · · ≤ δP1(x) ≤ δP0(x). Moreover, by using induction it can
be shown that
lPj (x) ≤ lP0(x) + γ1δP0(x) +
[ j−1∑
g=1
(γg+1 − γg)δPg (x)
]
− γjδPj (x). (5)
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Using (5), we then have
C(x) ≤
h∑
j=1
rj lPj (x) (by choice of the paths Pj)
≤
h∑
j=1
rj
(
lP0(x) + γ1δP0(x) +
[ j−1∑
g=1
(γg+1 − γg)δPg (x)
]
− γjδPj (x)
)
= lP0(x) + γ1δP0(x) +
h∑
j=1
(rj+1 + · · · + rh)(γj+1 − γj)δPj (x) − rjγjδPj (x)
≤ lP0(x) + γ1δP0(x)
+
h−1∑
j=1
[
(rj+1 + · · · + rh)γj+1 − (rj + rj+1 + · · · + rh)γj
]
δPj (x)
In the last inequality, we leave out the last negative term −rhγhδPh(x). Note
that γ1 = (r1 + · · · + rh)γ1 since we have normalized the demand to 1. We can
then apply Lemma1 with τi = δPi(x) for i = 0, . . . , h − 1 and ci = γi ·
∑h
p=i rp
for i = 1, . . . , k. Continuing the estimate, we get
C(x) ≤ lP0(x) + max
j∈[h]
{
γj ·
h∑
p=j
rp
}
· δP0(x) ≤
[
1 + β · max
j∈[h]
{
γj
( h∑
p=j
rp
)}]
C(z)
where for the second inequality we use that δP0(x) ≤ βlP0(x), which holds by
definition, and lP0(x) = lP0(z) = C(z), which holds because z is an original Nash
flow and all arcs in P0 have strictly positive flow in z (and because of the fact
that all arcs in P0 have a constant latency functions).
To prove tightness, fix j ∈ [h] and consider the following instance on two
arcs. We take (l1(y), δ1(y)) = (1, β) and (l2(y), δ2(y)) with δ2(y) = 0 and l2(y)
a strictly increasing function satisfying l2(0) = 1 +  and l2(rj + rj+1 + · · · +
rh) = 1 + γjβ, where  < γjβ. The (unique) original Nash flow is given by
z = (z1, z2) = (1, 0) with C(z) = 1. The (unique) β-deviated Nash flow x
is given by x = (x1, x2) = (r1 + r2 + · · · + rj−1, rj + rj+1 + · · · + rh) with
C(x) = 1 + β · γj(rj + · · · + rh). Since this construction holds for all j ∈ [h], we
find the desired lower bound. 	unionsq
Continuous Sensitivity Distributions. We obtain a similar result for more gen-
eral (not necessarily discrete) sensitivity distributions. That is, we are given a
Lebesgue integrable sensitivity density function ψ : R≥0 → R≥0 over the total
demand. Since we can normalize the demand to 1, we have the condition that∫ ∞
0
ψ(y)dy = 1. We then find the following natural generalizations of our upper
bounds:
1. -SR(I) ≤ 1 + β ∫ ∞
0
y · ψ(y)dy, and
2. β-DR(I) ≤ 1 + β · supt∈R≥0
{
t · ∫ ∞
t
ψ(y)dy
}
.
These bounds are both asymptotically tight for all distributions. Details are
given the full version [7].
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4 Homogeneous Population
The reverse of Proposition 1 also holds for homogeneous players in single-
commodity instances. As a consequence, the set of β-deviated Nash flows and
the set of -approximate Nash flows with  = βγ coincide in this case.
Recall that for homogeneous players we have γij = γ for all i ∈ [k], j ∈ [hi]
and some γ ≥ 0.
Proposition 2. Let I be a single-commodity congestion game with homoge-
neous players. f is an -approximate Nash flow for I if and only if f is a
β-deviated Nash flow for I with  = βγ.
Upper Bound on the Stability Ratio. Our main result in this section is an upper
bound on the -stability ratio. Given the above equivalence, this bound also
applies to the β-deviation ratio with  = βγ.
The following concept of alternating paths is crucial. For single-commodity
instances an alternating path always exists (see, e.g., [13]) (Fig. 1).
Z1
C11
C21
C22
X
1
1
Z2
X
2
1
X
2
2
D11
D21
D22
Z3
Fig. 1. Sketch of the situation in the proof of Theorem2 with q1 = 1 and q2 = 2.
Definition 1 (Alternating path [10,13]). Let I be a single-commodity net-
work congestion game and let x and z be feasible flows. We partition the
edges E = X ∪ Z such that Z = {a ∈ E : za ≥ xa and za > 0} and
X = {a ∈ E : za < xa or za = xa = 0}. We say that π is an alternating
s, t-path if the arcs in π ∩ Z are oriented in the direction of t, and the arcs in
π ∩ X are oriented in the direction of s. We call the number of backward arcs
on π the backward length of π and refer to it by q(π) = |π ∩ X|.
Theorem 2. Let I be a single-commodity network congestion game. Let  ≥ 0 be
fixed and consider an arbitrary alternating path π with backward length q = q(π).
If  < 1/q, then the -stability ratio is bounded by
-SR(I) ≤ 1 + 
1 −  · q ≤
1 + 
1 −  · n.
Note that the restriction on  stated in the theorem always holds if  < 1/n. In
particular, for   1/n we roughly get -SR(I) ≤ 1+n. The proof of Theorem2
is inspired by a technique of Nikolova and Stier-Moses [13], but technically more
involved.
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Proof. Let x = f  be an -approximate Nash flow and let z = f0 an original
Nash flow. Let π = Z1X1Z2X2 . . . Zη−1Xη−1Zη be an alternating path for x
and z, where Zi and Xi are maximal sections consisting of consecutive arcs,
respectively, in Z and X (i.e., Zi ⊆ Z and Xi ⊆ X for all i). Furthermore, we
let qi = |Xi| and write Xi = (Xiqi , . . . , Xi2,Xi1), where Xij are the arcs in the
section Xi. By definition, for every arc Xij there exists a path CijXijDij that
is flow-carrying for x.5
For convenience, we define C01 = Dη,0 = ∅. Furthermore, we denote Pmax as
a path maximizing lP (x) over all paths P ∈ S. For convenience, we will abuse
notation, and write Q = Q(x) =
∑
a∈Q la(x) for Q ⊆ E.
Note that for all i, j:
Cij(x) + Xij(x) + Dij(x) ≤ Pmax(x). (6)
Fix some i ∈ {1, . . . , η−1}. Then we have Ci1+Xi1+Di1 ≤ (1+)(Ci−1,qi−1+
Zi+Di1) by definition of an -approximate Nash flow. This implies that (leaving
out Di1 on both sides) Ci1 + Xi1 ≤ (1 + )Zi + Ci−1,qi−1 + (Ci−1,qi−1 + Di1).
Furthermore, for all j ∈ {2, . . . , qi}, we have Cij+Xij+Dij ≤ (1+)(Ci,j−1+Dij)
which implies (again leaving out Dij on both sides)
Cij + Xij ≤ Ci,j−1 + (Ci,j−1 + Dij).
Adding up these inequalities for j ∈ {1, . . . , qi} and subtracting
∑qi−1
j=1 Cij from
both sides, we obtain for all i ∈ {1, . . . , η − 1}
Ci,qi +
qi∑
j=1
Xij ≤ Ci−1,qi−1 + (1+ )Zi + 
( qi∑
j=1
Dij +Ci−1,qi−1 +
qi−1∑
j=1
Cij
)
. (7)
Moreover, we also have
Pmax ≤ (1 + )(Cη−1,η−1 + Zη) = Cη−1,η−1 + (1 + )Zη + Cη−1,η−1. (8)
Adding up the inequalities in (7) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , η − 1}, and the inequality in
(8), we obtain
Pmax +
η−1∑
i=1
Ci,qi +
η−1∑
i=1
qi∑
j=1
Xij ≤
η−1∑
i=1
Ci,qi +(1+ )
η∑
i=1
Zi + 
( η−1∑
i=1
qi∑
j=1
Cij +Dij
)
which simplifies to
Pmax +
η−1∑
i=1
qi∑
j=1
Xij ≤ (1 + )
η∑
i=1
Zi + 
( η−1∑
i=1
qi∑
j=1
Cij + Dij
)
. (9)
5 Note that for a Nash flow one can assume that there is a flow-carrying path traversing
all arcs Xiqi , . . . , Xi1; but this cannot be done for an approximate Nash flow.
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Using (6), we obtain
η−1∑
i=1
qi∑
j=1
Cij + Dij ≤
η−1∑
i=1
qi∑
j=1
Pmax − Xij =
( η−1∑
i=1
qi
)
Pmax −
η−1∑
i=1
qi∑
j=1
Xij .
Combining this with (9), and rearranging some terms, we get
(1 −  · q)Pmax ≤ (1 + )
[ η∑
i=1
Zi −
η−1∑
i=1
qi∑
j=1
Xij
]
= (1 + )
[ ∑
e∈Z∩π
le(xe) −
∑
e∈X∩π
le(xe)
]
where q = q(π) =
∑η−1
i=1 qi is the backward length of π.
Similarly (see also [13, Lemma 4.5]), it can be shown that
lQ(z) ≥
∑
e∈Z∩π
le(ze) −
∑
e∈X∩π
le(ze) (10)
for any path Q with zQ > 0 (these all have the same latency, since z is an original
Nash flow). Using a similar argument as in [13, Theorem 4.6], we obtain
(1 −  · q)lPmax(x) ≤ (1 + )
[ ∑
e∈Z∩π
le(xe) −
∑
e∈X∩π
le(xe)
]
≤ (1 + )
[ ∑
e∈Z∩π
le(ze) −
∑
e∈X∩π
le(ze)
]
≤ (1 + )lQ(z).
By multiplying both sides with the demand r, we obtain (1 −  · q)C(x) ≤
(1 −  · q)r · lPmax(x) ≤ (1 + )r · lQ(z) = (1 + )C(z) for  < 1/q, which proves
the claim. 	unionsq
Tight Bound on the Stability Ratio. In this section, we consider instances for
which all backward sections of the alternating path π consist of a single arc.,
i.e., qi = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , η − 1. We then have q =
∑η−1
i=1 qi ≤ n/2 − 1 since
every arc in X must be followed directly by an arc in Z (and we can assume
w.l.o.g. that the first and last arc are contained in Z). By Theorem2, we obtain
-SR(I) ≤ (1+)/(1− ·(n/2−1)) for all  < 1/(n/2−1). We show that this
bound is tight. Further, we show that there exist instances for which -SR(I) is
unbounded for  ≥ 1/(n/2 − 1). This completely settles the case of qi = 1 for
all i.
Our construction is based on the generalized Braess graph [14]. By construc-
tion, alternating paths for these graphs satisfy qi = 1 for all i. See the full version
[7] for details.
Theorem 3. Let n = 2m be fixed and let Bm be the set of all instances on the
generalized Braess graph with n nodes. Then
sup
I∈Bm
-SR(I) =
{
1+
1−·(n/2	−1) if  <
1
n/2	−1 ,
∞ otherwise.
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Non-symmetric Matroid Congestion Games. In the previous sections, we con-
sidered (symmetric) network congestion games only. It is interesting to consider
other combinatorial strategy sets as well. In this section we make a first step in
this direction by focusing on the bases of matroids as strategies.
A matroid congestion game is given by J = (E, (le)e∈E , (Si)i∈[k], (ri)i∈[k]),
and matroids Mi = (E, Ii) over the ground set E for every i ∈ [k].6 The strategy
set Si consists of the bases of the matroid Mi, which are the independent sets of
maximum size, e.g., spanning trees in an undirected graph. We refer the reader
to Schrijver [16] for an extensive overview of matroid theory.
As for network congestion games, it can be shown that in general the -
stability ratio can be unbounded (see Theorem 5 [7] in the appendix of [7]);
this also holds for general path deviations because the proof of Proposition 2
in the appendix holds for arbitrary strategy sets. However, if we consider path
deviations induced by the sum of edge deviations (as in [6,13]), then we can
obtain a more positive result for general matroids.
Recall that for every resource e ∈ E we have a deviation function δe : R≥0 →
R≥0 satisfying 0 ≤ δe(x) ≤ βle(x) for all x ≥ 0. The deviation of a basis B is
then given by δB(f) =
∑
e∈B δe(fe).
Theorem 4. Let J = (E, (le)e∈E , (Si)i∈[k], (ri)i∈[k]) be a matroid congestion
game with homogeneous players. Let β ≥ 0 be fixed and consider β-bounded
basis deviations as defined above. Then the β-deviation ratio is upper bounded
by β-DR(J ) ≤ 1 + β. Further, this bound is tight already for 1-uniform matroid
congestion games.
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